The following is a very interesting article from the Los Angeles Times on how human rights activists and humanitarian aid workers can have completely opposite strategies on how to deal with populations undergoing crimes against humanity, in this particular case in Darfur. While human rights organizations advocate interventionist policies, with the aim to stop the genocide, humanitarian aid groups fear that such policies will make the humanitarian situation worse, at least in the short term.
I'm not personally always in favor of humanitarian intervention. I was against the Kosovo war (because it was a NATO rather than UN military campaign, I feared that if we started a precedent that any multilateral organization could start a war if they found reasons to do it, one day it would be abused; history has proven me right) and I did not support the ill-fated US invasion of Somalia. But I do believe that sometimes, when the worst of the worst crimes are committed, including genocide, humanitarian intervention is a must. It's true that in the short term it will bring more sorrow - more death, more displacement, more hunger -, but in the long term it means saving a people from utter destruction. And there is no more fundamental right than that of a people to exist as such.
Los Angeles Times June 24, 2007 Sunday
OPINION
Good vs. good
A clash between rights activists and relief workers is unavoidable in Darfur,
despite everyone's efforts to do what's right.
By: David Rieff, DAVID RIEFF is the author of "At the Point of a Gun:
Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention" and "A Bed for the Night:
Humanitarianism in Crisis."
THE CRISIS IN Darfur has exposed many fault lines. One of the cruelest is the
emerging divide between the human rights activists grouped around the Save
Darfur coalition in the U.S. (and S.O.S. Darfur in Western Europe) and the
humanitarian workers in relief groups working on the ground in Darfur and across
the border in Chad with refugees and internally displaced people.
Surprised to hear that they're in conflict? Most members of the general
public understandably imagine that human rights advocacy groups and humanitarian
relief organizations are natural allies -- both on the side of the angels,
fighting against brutality and repression on behalf of refugees and the
oppressed and the threatened. This belief is surely reinforced by the fact that
we routinely describe interventions that are designed to protect people from
mass murder or ethnic cleansing as "humanitarian" interventions when, in fact,
that may not be the case at all. In the case of Darfur, where at least 200,000
people have been killed and millions have fled their homes in recent years, the
opposite may be true.
News stories have reported that a number of relief groups on the ground in
Darfur (most notably, Doctors Without Borders, which has one of the largest and
most effective programs in the region) had been privately complaining about Save
Darfur's activities in the U.S. -- complaints that many believe led to a
shake-up in the organization and its board's decision to remove the group's
director, David Rubenstein.
What prompted the complaints were a series of ads run by Save Darfur calling
for more aggressive action in Darfur, including the imposition of a "no-fly"
zone over western Sudan to prevent attacks by the Sudanese air force on the
Darfurians. For humanitarian relief groups, the effect of this, however well
intended, would be to put the on-the-ground aid effort at risk because the
relief organizations themselves fly constantly over Darfur in aircraft virtually
indistinguishable from those fielded by the government of Sudan.
Even more important, relief organizations including Doctors Without Borders
and Action Against Hunger argue that this no-fly zone would have to be
established without Khartoum's consent and, as an Action Against Hunger
statement put it, would "have disastrous consequences that risk triggering a
further escalation of violence while jeopardizing the provision of vital
humanitarian assistance to millions of people."
Some activists in the U.S. have taken this message to heart. But the general
thrust of the activists' message has been that either a no-fly zone or some kind
of outside military intervention is the only thing that will stop what they
believe is a slow-motion genocide.
Generally, humanitarian aid groups see nothing wrong with advocacy
organizations like Save Darfur campaigning to mobilize world public opinion
about the plight of the Darfurians (though some of the mainline relief NGOs,
notably Doctors Without Borders, have disputed the assertion that what's going
on in Darfur is, in fact, genocide). But they are quick to point out that human
rights activists do not remain on the ground in Darfur and do not have the
burden of looking after the immediate needs of the refugees and the internally
displaced. To the relief groups, the chief danger of an outside military
intervention is that, to paraphrase that infamous remark by the American officer
in Vietnam, the interveners will destroy Darfur in order to save it.
Pro-intervention advocates in the human rights community, in contrast, tend
to take the view that relief workers are being too cautious. They point out that
the same anxieties were voiced by many aid groups during the Bosnian war and in
the run-up to the war in Afghanistan, and that, given Khartoum's refusal to curb
its murderous surrogates in Darfur, outside military intervention is the only
viable solution both practically and morally. In their view, allowing the
current political and military situation to continue so that humanitarian aid
can be dispensed may have short-term benefits, but it condemns the Darfurians to
a future of endless human destruction. Far from helping, they argue, relief
without intervention amounts to keeping people alive now so the Sudanese
government forces can kill them later -- a Band-Aid on a cancer, as some
activists put it.
There is no question that both sides believe they are acting morally. And, in
fairness, it should be noted that there are some in the humanitarian aid
community who do favor outside intervention, even if they have been reluctant to
voice this view publicly.
But even taking these shadings into account, the disagreement is fundamental.
It illustrates the sad truth that not only do all good things not go together,
but that in fact they can sometimes be in opposition to each other. As the
philosopher Hegel observed: "Tragedy is the conflict between two rights."
Of course, whether an international military intervention in Darfur would
even be effective is an open question. The international forces would be
protecting more than 100 refugee camps in an area the size of France with a
force that even the most optimistic estimate places at no more than 30,000
troops. And some people involved in the peace negotiations between Khartoum and
the rebels believe that an intervention would solve nothing.
The dispute between advocacy groups and relief organizations, however, is
systemic rather than Darfur-specific. Similar tensions existed, for example,
between human rights advocates and relief groups in Kosovo at a time when the
advocacy groups were calling for stepped-up military action. And in the run-up
to the war in Afghanistan, feminist groups desperate to see an end to the
Taliban's oppression of women clashed repeatedly with aid groups, which viewed
any war as likely to cause enormous human suffering.
Starkly put, human rights groups want solutions to crises -- including
military solutions if necessary -- whereas humanitarian relief NGOs seek to
palliate the effects of war and ethnic cleansing, and they believe that outside
military interventions make their position on the ground untenable because
neutrality is at the core of the humanitarian enterprise.
They point out that, in fact, the logic of "humanitarian intervention" is
regime change -- a charge that at least some advocates do not deny. What is
not in dispute is that, in the final analysis, the activist politics of
confrontation and the humanitarian politics of palliation are incompatible,
much as both sides might wish it otherwise.
Copyright 2007 Los Angeles Times
All Rights Reserved
SUDAN ACCEPTS UN-AFRICAN FORCE FOR DARFUR WITHOUT CONDITIONS -- COUNCIL OFFICIAL
New York, Jun 17 2007 11:00PM
Sudan's Government has agreed to support unconditionally the deployment of a hybrid United Nations-African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in the Darfur region following talks in Khartoum with a delegation of the Security Council, which said that it would seek funding for the operation from the UN budget.
"I can tell you that the Foreign Minister told us in no uncertain terms that the Government of Sudan accepted the hybrid operation without any conditionality. The President himself just confirmed the same thing to us," Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo of South Africa said at a press conference following the meetings.
"The Sudanese leadership, at the level of the President of the Republic, has confirmed that the State of Sudan is committed to all the agreements signed -- including the recent agreement signed in Addis Ababa on a hybrid operation in Darfur," Sudan's Foreign Minister, Lam Akol, told reporters.
"The President of the Republic has made it clear that the ball is now in the court of the United Nations," he added.
Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry of the United Kingdom said the Security Council's would seek financing for the force from the UN's regular peacekeeping budget, meaning that the cost would be borne by all UN Member States.
"We all laid heavy emphasis in two long constructive meetings and over lunch" on the hybrid force with emphasis on the need "to accelerate the implementation and get that in place as soon as possible," he said.
Stressing that "there isn't going to be an enduring peace unless there is a political settlement," he said Council members called for accelerated efforts on that front. "The Government confirmed its commitment to pursue that, and I quote the Minister, 'aggressively' -- meaning that the Government is fully committed to it."
Sudanese officials also provided "certain assurances" on humanitarian access to those in need.
On the need for a ceasefire, Ambassador Jon
members stressed that Government "should exercise a measure of self-restraint faced with lots of temptations given the performance of the rebels."
The purpose of the visit was to reaffirm the Council's commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Sudan while encouraging its Government and other parties to engage constructively in the Darfur peace process, said Ambassador Kumalo.
In addition the aim was to "achieve without delay, full agreement" on deploying the hybrid operation. The Council also "came to encourage all parties here to fully implement the ceasefire agreement," he added.
Asked when the Council would recommend that the General Assembly authorize funding for the hybrid force, Ambassador Kumalo said this would happen "within a month."
Despite the "peace agreements", the civilian population of Darfur continues being victims of torture, arbitrary arrests and harassment by government security organs. The following OMCT urgent action details violations against specific individuals.
Case SDN 270606
Arbitrary arrest / Torture / Harassment
The International Secretariat of the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) requests your URGENT intervention in the following situation in Sudan.
Brief description of the situation
The International Secretariat of OMCT has been informed by the Sudan Organisation Against Torture (SOAT), a member of OMCT network, about the continuing torture, arbitrary arrests and harassment of the civilian population in Darfur by government security organs despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).
According to the information received, on 11 June 2006, five police officers from the Central Reserve Police arrested Mr. Sideeg Musa Saed (20 yrs), a student, and Mr. Ismail Musa Abdel Gadeem (26 yrs), a teacher, from Alsouque Alshabi central market in Nyala on suspicion of supporting the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA), a faction of which is signatory to the DPA. The men who belong to the Zaghawa tribe were taken to the offices of the reserve police in Nyala where they were reportedly subjected to torture. The men were beaten with the butt of the officers’ guns on their heads and backs and flogged all over their body. Mr. Saead sustained serious injuries to his eye. On the same day, Mr. Sideeg Musa Saed and Mr. Ismail Musa Abdel Gadeem were transferred to Nyala Wasat Police station where they were officially charged with articles 50 (Undermining the Constitutional System) and 51 (Waging war against the State) of the 1991 Penal code. SOAT Lawyers Network in Nyala is providing legal aid to the two men.
Moreover, on 11 June 2006 at approximately 08.00 am, armed militias, reportedly the Janjaweed militias, allegedly attacked Mr. Musa Ahmed Abdel Nour (50 yrs), from the Dago tribe and resident at Dereig IDP camp whilst he was escorting two elderly women to collect firewood outside the camp. During the attack the militias threatened Mr. Abdel Nour with a gun before kidnapping him and taking his horse and forcing the two women to walk back to the camp. Mr. Abdel Nour was released on the same day at 14.00 pm. Following his release, Mr. Abdel Nour left Dereig camp and is now staying at Kalma camp.
Furthermore it is reported that on 6 June 2006, three armed militias, reportedly the Janjaweed militias, attacked Mr. Abdullah Ahmed Adam (50 yrs), Dago tribe, from Kalma IDP camp. Mr. Adam was attacked 2 km north of the camp; he was threatened by the militias after which they took his horse.
The International Secretariat of OMCT urges the Sudanese authorities to immediately implement its obligations as agreed in the DPA. The International Secretariat of OMCT together with SOAT expresses its grave concern over the continued targeting of the civilian population by the Janjaweed militias and the arrests and detention on suspicion of supporting the SLA.
It should be recalled that article 27(315) of the DPA requires the Government of Sudan to “restrict all Janjaweed/armed militia and PDF to their headquarters, garrisons, cantonment sites or communities and take other steps to contain, reduce and ultimately eliminate the threat posed by such forces”. Furthermore, article 27 (317) states that “Government of Sudan, with support from AMIS, shall take all other steps required to completely eliminate the threat posed by Janjaweed/armed militia to the civilian population....”.
Action Requested
Please write to the authorities in Sudan urging them to:
Guarantee the physical and psychological integrity of Mr. Sideeg Musa Saed and Mr. Ismail Musa Abdel Gadeem;
Order their immediate release in the absence of valid legal charges, and if such charges exist, to ensure that they are given a prompt and fair trial, in which their procedural rights are guaranteed at all times;
Order a thorough and impartial investigation into all these events, in order to identify all those responsible, bring them to trial and apply the civil, penal and/or administrative sanctions as provided by law;
Guarantee that adequate compensation is awarded to Mr. Sideeg Musa Saed, Mr. Ismail Musa Abdel Gadeem, Mr. Musa Ahmed Abdel Nour and Mr. Abdullah Ahmed Adam;
Guarantee the respect of human rights and the fundamental freedoms throughout the country in accordance with national laws and international human rights standards.
Addresses
His Excellency Lieutenant General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, President of the Republic of Sudan, Presidential Palace, PO Box 281, Khartoum, Sudan, Fax: +249 183 783 223
His Excellency Salva Kiir Mayardit, First Vice-President, People’s Palace, PO Box 281, Khartoum, Sudan, Fax: + 249 11 779977 / 771025
His Excellency Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Vice-President, People’s Palace, PO Box 281, Khartoum, Sudan, Fax: + 249 183 77 10 25
Mr Ali Mohamed Osman Yassin, Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Ministry of Justice, Khartoum, Sudan, Fax: + 249 183 78 07 96
Mr Lam Akol Ajawin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/External Relations, PO Box 873, Khartoum, Sudan, Fax: + 249 183 77 93 83
Mr. Al Zubeir Beshir Taha, Minister of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Interior, PO Box 873, Khartoum, Sudan, Fax: +249 183 77 93 83
Dr Nafie Ali Nafie, Minister of Federal Government, Office of the Presidents People’s Palace, PO Box 281, Khartoum, Sudan, Fax: +249 117 71 651/ 78 32 23
Dr Yasir Sid Ahmed, Head of the Advisory Council for Human Rights PO Box 302, Khartoum, Sudan, Fax: +249 183 770 883
Dr Abdelmuneim Osman Mohamed Taha, Advisory Council for Human Rights, Rapporteur, PO Box 302, Khartoum, Sudan, Fax: +249 183 77 08 83
Prof. Ali Mohamed Ali Shommou, The National Press and Publications Council, P O Box 11111, Osman Digna St., Khartoum East Sudan, Fax: + 249 183 77 19 25
His Excellency Ambassador Mr. Mohamed Elhassan Ahmed Elhaj, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sudan to the United Nations in Geneva, Avenue Blanc 47, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland, Tel: +41 22 731 26 63, Fax: +41 22 731 26 56, Email: mission.sudan@bluewin.ch / mission.sudan@ties.itu.int
The Embassy of Sudan in Brussels, Mr. Ali Yousif Ahmed, Av. F.D. Roosevelt, 124, 1050 Brussels, Belgium. Tel.: + 32 2 647 51 59 / 94 94, Fax: + 32 (2) 648 34 99, Email: sudanbx@yahoo.com
Please also write to the embassies of Sudan in your respective country.
***
Geneva, 27 June 2006
Kindly inform us of any action undertaken quoting the code of this appeal in your reply.